

LEST WE FALTER*

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At the end of each war is the time for the nation to ponder. So should it be for us after the 17 days' war with Pakistan. It is now for us to make an honest assessment of our weaknesses and strong points as brought out by this war and start preparing for the next; who can now doubt the inevitability of wars? The decisive victory that we have won is a rare honour for the nation in general and the Armed Forces in particular. The danger lies in our becoming complacent and taking the future victory also for granted. We must remember that the present victory has been paid for very dearly and is the result of a decade of hard labour and sacrifice on the part of the Armed Forces and the nation. The future victory will also therefore depend on the labour and sacrifice that we put in today. The modesty with which the nation has taken the victory in its stride, indeed, reflects the maturity of the nation; an ideal background for preparing for the future one.

Generals have often been reproached with preparing for the last war instead for the next. This probably is not true of our generals who, after the 1965 war, had certainly prepared for the next one that they fought in 1971. But the nation must also understand that any future war that we might have to fight may not follow the pattern of the 14 days war. For one thing it may last much longer and for another it may not be limited to our fight with Pakistan alone. Victory against Pakistan and China combined does not any longer appear wishful thinking, but is now a possibility. Not so, however, with our present state of preparedness, but certainly with a build-up which is well within our reach. This in fact should be our defence objective and we must not rest anywhere short of it.

THE 14 DAYS WAR

It would be as wrong to underrate our victory as it would be to overrate it. It is only the correct assessment that would both sustain our confidence in ourselves as well as indicate the distance we have yet to cover to reach our defence objective. How we won the 14-day war can be summed up by saying that a set of circumstances presented themselves before us and with superb political sagaciousness and general-ship we converted them into a splendid victory. Much of the splendour of the victory, however, can be attributed to the total absence of political leadership in Pakistan, their poor general-ship and moral degradation of their troops, which brought about a much faster collapse than could be expected. The fact that we have been lucky does not in any way diminish our credit for winning the war. Luck is always an important war winning factor. The credit goes to the victor for exploiting his luck.

What is, however, pertinent in our assessment is the fact that the threat that we faced matched exactly with our state of defence preparedness. Besides, the fact that some favourable circumstances presented themselves before us, there were some unfavourable ones which could have appeared but did not. What the fate of the war would have been in case China and the US had intervened (even if in a limited way) is difficult to say, but the results could not have been as favourable as they have been. Would the Russians have risked a world war for our sake? Even if they had, it would not have prevented an enormous defence burden from falling on our shoulders. Where was our capacity to shoulder anything more than we were already doing.

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Having had the advantage of facing only one of our foes, we should have been able to give even a more crushing blow to Pakistan, with a much lesser loss to ourselves had we been prepared or near prepared for both. We are four times the size of Pakistan and the world feels that we have won because of this. Yet we know that we hardly had any numerical superiority or material superiority over the Pakistanis in the last war – at least not as much as we should have had before venturing to punish them the way we did. The fact that nearly 10,000 casualties (according to press reports) did not deter our troops in their deep thrust into enemy territory, speaks highly of the valour of Indian troops. But would we have not suffered less in men and material had we a larger armed force than we did?

Even with a little larger force we might have turned the 14-day war into an Israeli-type six-day war. Commenting on the war, General Aurora mentions how the dropping of an air-borne battalion in the vicinity of Dacca was reported in the press as the dropping of an air-borne brigade and believing this, the Pakistanis hastened to surrender. What would have happened if we had actually dropped an air-borne division a few days earlier is not difficult to image. We would not have then had to struggle for the bridgehead over the Bhairab River for a number of days like we did. Due to the north-south flow of the rivers, geography dictated that the quickest way to reach Dacca was along the obstacle free Mymensingh-Dacca axis and yet we were the slowest along this axis. A quicker advance by a larger force along this axis might have had our troops knocking at the gates of Dacca much earlier than they did. Similarly on the western front, where we fought practically one to one, an additional two divisions with the force that carried out the masterly strategic thrust into Sind, would have yielded much more spectacular and decisive results. All in all with just four extra divisions, we might have crippled Pakistan's war machine and won a more decisive victory before the United Nations could have started its deliberations or the Seventh Fleet could have reached the Bay of Bengal.

In spite of our victory, there is no room for complacency as far as defence preparedness is concerned. The last war has certainly shown that ever since the fateful year of 1962, we have moved in the right direction, but it is no indication that we have move far enough.

THE NATURE OF FUTURE THREAT

China

Although, outwardly, China has created a border dispute with us to justify its military actions, the real source of threat lies in its general policy of fomenting "word revolution" and thereby attaining world domination. Her not-too-secret claim over vast portions of our country – including the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, and parts of Assam and Bengal – should be an eye opener to those who believe, or want others to believe, that the Sino – Indian dispute is merely a border dispute which could be sorted out across a conference table.

It would also be unwise for us to believe that this Chinese claim is only to scare us into accepting their claim on the disputed territory along the border, as some appear to suggest. This is, in fact, the Chinese national objective, in keeping with their expansionist policy. However ridiculous the Chinese claim may look to today, it still remains an ever explosive cause for a future war and, therefore, cannot be ignored. Besides, claims, when they lie unchallenged for years, (say, hundred years), tend to become real. A false territorial claim must, therefore, be treated with as much serious concern as an actual invasion of the country.

Our resistance to Chinese nibbling of our territory should form part of a general policy to cry a halt the territorial disintegration of our country. For this we must be farsighted, looking decades and centuries ahead. Any short sighted vision that does not see in the disputed territory anything more than a "vast expanse of waste-land", which could be bartered for peace, would

prove disastrous. The territorial transformation that a country may undergo through voluntary surrenders or under external pressure may be so gradual as not to be discernible to the ordinary national. Who has ever bothered about the fact that India today is less than half the size it was less than forty years back? And what are forty years in the life of a nation? Hitler may have used his maxim that “no country was created by God” as a justification for committing aggression, but to us it could at least serve to drive the fact home that territorial sanctity is maintained by force and not merely through the goodwill of a neighbour.

India is China’s real rival and every time we rise in political stature, it will try to cut us down in size. China brought us tumbling down political heights in 1962. We are now once again a source of its envy and should expect a war any moment.

Pakistan

Most of the Indo-Pakistani disputes are a result of the unnatural division of the subcontinent. On the face of it, therefore, it should not be difficult for these two countries to settle these disputes through mutual adjustment under an appropriate climate of amity. In fact, however, such a climate cannot be created due to other factors. One such factor is the two-nation theory which resulted in the formation of Pakistan. The triumph of the two-nation theory at the time of partition was the triumph of suspicion, hatred and intolerance. This has all along been kept alive by the political leadership in Pakistan which has little else to offer to its people.

Even the breaking up of Pakistan, though a severe jolt to the two-nation theory, is not likely to minimize the threat from what remains of Pakistan. The Bengali Muslim was never a staunch supporter of the two-nation theory. Nor did he add much to the war potential of Pakistan except in the shape of earning foreign exchange. The bitterness caused by the humiliating defeat inflicted on them, the American policy of balancing Pakistan against India, and China’s interest in tying down the maximum of forces with Pakistan, all add up to keep the threat from Pakistan alive not only for the present, but for many years to come. Kashmir is a ready excuse for them to start a war at any time.

The Common Factor

The one common factor that emerges from the study of both the threats is their permanent nature. War with one or the other or both can break out at any time, and we must be ever prepared for the worst – that is, to meet the threat from both. Preparation for war is a continuous process, and time once lost can never be made up. Therefore, although we should always welcome a hand of friendship when extended to us, we must not be unnecessarily lured by any “ping pong diplomacy” and get lulled into complacency. An attempt to lull us into such complacency may be part of a well planned strategy of our potential enemies.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THREAT

Pakistan

Having successfully fought with Pakistan twice, there can be hardly any doubt regarding the magnitude of the threat from Pakistan. We only need to keep a track of their future build up and prepare accordingly. As things stand today and as was made clear by our recent war, our present armed strength is just sufficient to deal effectively with Pakistan. We probably have some infantry divisions which could be diverted against China, even while we are fighting with Pakistan, but not a portion of the Air Force or the Navy could be extricated without undue detriment.

Threat through Tibet

The Chinese are believed to be having, at present, 13 infantry divisions poised against us along the Indo-Tibetan border. However, while assessing the threat from the Chinese army in Tibet we must also take into account their ability to reinforce this army with troops from the mainland. There are two main limitations that would restrict them in their reinforcement programme. These limitations must not, however, make us over-optimistic in our assessment of the Chinese threat through Tibet. It is difficult to assess the military potential of a totalitarian regime which has war as its creed. Their tight security of information deprives us of the accurate data required for our appreciation and their sub-standard subsistence upsets our calculations of their logistical problems.

According to information available, out of a total of 115 infantry divisions, the Chinese have deployed 28 against Taiwan, 50 against Russia and 13 in Tibet leaving a reserve of about 24 infantry divisions. This reserve is, however, not uncommitted, as it includes troops that have been kept as standby for Laos and Vietnam. Even then it would not be safe to assume that they are not in a position to reinforce their army in Tibet. Besides, with 300,000 security and border troops available to her to play about with, it should not be difficult for her to squeeze out a couple of divisions from other not so active theatres.

It would thus appear that the only limiting factor would be the number of troops that can be sustained in Tibet. This limitation would also have been overcome by the Chinese over the years they have occupied Tibet, by advanced stocking and through stepped up food procurement schemes. Considering all these factors it would be reasonable to assume that a threat from up to 20 infantry divisions exists from across the Indo-Tibetan border.

Threat through Burma

The threat from the Chinese Army does not just come from the forces in Tibet. It also poses a sizeable threat to our eastern region through Burma; this in spite of the ideal relations and cooperation that exists between us and the Burmese. The fact is that despite the gallant efforts of the small Burmese Army, they have not been able to bring North Burma under their *de facto* control. The comparative ease with which hostile Naga gangs have moved from India to Yunnan and back through this part of Burma, adequately demonstrates the vulnerability of our eastern frontier to a Chinese invasion. This threat should, therefore, be of as serious a concern to us as that through Tibet, and must be planned for with equal urgency.

Many arguments could, perhaps, be put forward to discount the possibility of a Chinese invasion through Burma. Such arguments were put forward to rule out the possibility of Japanese invasion through Burma before it came, and we know to what result. For the Chinese it is going to be an easier affair than it was for the Japanese. Their lines of communications will be much shorter. Let us also not feel that lack of roads through North Burma is going to be any serious limitation to the number of troops that they can deploy here. We must not forget that lack of roads has never been a serious limitation to any Chinese advance. With their sub standard logistic requirements and extensive use of manpower for transportation purposes, they can sustain their troops in a country not connected by roads with their base, long enough for their peculiar road construction to catch up with their advancing troops. During their 1962 invasion, they are known to have rapidly constructed roads right up to their forward troops within days of the commencement of the advance. The country does, however, impose some limitations, and in this case it would be reasonable to assume that the Chinese will not be able to deploy more than three divisions for an invasion of India through North Burma. They could probably bring more along the Stilwell Road but they are not likely to take this line of advance as it would entail

move through territory under more effective control of the Burmese, and invasion of India would involve invasion of Burma also. Needless to say that we should be prepared to go to the aid of the Burmese in case Burma is invaded.

Our Army Requirements

Due to the nature of the terrain in areas of likely operations, the infantry is going to be the decisive arm. So our main requirement against the Chinese would be that of infantry; and as such type of terrain has a tendency to “eat up troops”, we will need plenty of them. Another factor to be considered while working out our requirements of troops would be the fact that there can be no defence without an offence. So even as a purely defensive measure, we must have troops earmarked for offensive action. The minimum requirement of the army just to hold out against the Chinese would thus work out roughly as under: -

Requirement of troops for tactical deployment against 20 Chinese infantry divisions in Tibet -	10 infantry divisions
Offensive action in Tibet	6 infantry divisions
Requirement of troops for deployment against Chinese invasion through Burma -	3 infantry divisions

	Total 19 infantry divisions

Considering that about five infantry divisions from our existing army could be spared after effective matching with Pakistan, there is a net requirement of about 14 additional divisions if we are to fight China and Pakistan simultaneously. We could probably save on the army requirement if we could develop greater strategic mobility, but that would prove costlier than having a larger army.

The Chinese Air Threat

Although China is believed to have the third largest air force in the world, it is unlikely that it will use its air force against us to any great extent for the following reasons:

- (a) Due to reasons of distance, the Chinese would have to base their aircraft in Tibet or areas adjoining, where it may not be possible to build up sufficient fuel reserves.
- (b) The mountainous terrain of the areas of likely operations precludes employment of the air force for effective tactical air support. Use of the air force being an expensive affair, the Chinese would not use it unless the returns are worthwhile.
- (c) Strategic bombing, which would entail bombing of civil areas, would tarnish their image as “liberators”, which forms the basis of all their wars.

All this is not to say that they would not use their air power at all. They could use it in a limited way for interdiction, air reconnaissance and as a deterrent to our transport aircraft. All limitations considered, it would not be difficult for them to employ up to ten fighter-bomber squadrons against us from airfields in Tibet, Yunnan and Sinkiang.

Countering Chinese Air Threat

Air supply for our army in Arunachal and Ladakh is practically inescapable and our air effort would mainly be directed towards providing air transport support to the army. Besides the normal supply mission, there is also a special requirement of the army operating in jungles and mountains for close air transport support by helicopters for increasing its tactical mobility. For carrying out these tasks and for preventing the Chinese air force from carrying out their tactical missions, our Air Force would be required to maintain a favourable air situation over the areas of

operation. The requirement of the air force against the Chinese would, therefore, work out roughly as under: -

- (a) for providing air transport support - 15 transport squadrons
- (b) for providing close air transport support - 8 helicopter squadrons
- (c) for maintaining favourable air situation - 15 FB squadrons

As there would not be much requirement of transport squadrons against Pakistan, we might be able to manage with our present strength against the Chinese. We would, however, definitely need to raise an additional force of Fighter Bombers and helicopters to meet the combined threat from China and Pakistan.

The Naval Threat

The Naval threat from China in event of a Sino-Indian war is seldom realised although the threat is very real. The reason for this is that we have not yet been woken up by any rude shock on this front. Needless to say that we cannot afford to wait for such a shock in order to realise the gravity of the threat. The sea routes are our life lines and are an obvious target for our enemies. If the Chinese did not attack these targets in 1962 it was because there was no need for them to do so. The victory on land itself had been quick and complete. In a future war, however, a quick walkover for them on land will not be possible and, faced with stiff opposition, they will take recourse to hitting us where it will hurt most – that is, our unprotected sea routes. By choking our aid and trade the Chinese could bring about the collapse of our army without fighting it. There is no reason why they should not do it.

The total Chinese fleet comprises of 4 destroyers, 12 frigates, 150 torpedo boats and 33 submarines. It is of interest to note that the number of submarines is quite out of proportion to the number of destroyers and frigates. These can pose a very serious threat to our shipping in the Indian Ocean. Who is there to check them. With the USA's new China policy, and the egregiously hostile posture of the 7th Fleet during the 14-day war, even if one does feel that the US will join China against us, one cannot expect the 7th Fleet to contain the Chinese Navy for our sake. In any case for how long and to what extent can a country expect to be protected by another even if it be by a friendly Russia?

Besides the existing naval threat from China and Pakistan we should also not forget how hostile Indonesia can be towards us with a pro-Peking government in power. Although there is no reason to doubt Indonesia at present, we must cater for the contingency of a hostile Indonesia while considering the naval threat from China and Pakistan. It does not take time for situations to change but it certainly takes time for a country to build up its navy.

Naval Requirement

The threat from the Chinese Navy comes mainly from its submarines. Our Navy, therefore, needs to primarily strengthen its anti-submarine base. However, the Indian Navy must also acquire a much larger fleet of submarines, not only to protect its own lines of communications, but also to threaten those of China to force it on to the defensive. With such a long coastline, India also needs a stronger coastal defence.

Nuclear Threat

Due to the disastrous consequences of starting a nuclear war, it could be reasoned that no country would want to start a nuclear war with another that possesses retaliatory power. But what happens when a non-nuclear power like India is up against a nuclear power like China? Initially when China opted to become a nuclear power, it was probably to attain immunity from a nuclear

attack from the US and the USSR. Having now attained nuclear power, and knowing that no country will ever risk a nuclear attack on itself for the sake of another, would China now be tempted to use that power against India who has no retaliatory power of its own? Apparently there is nothing to stop it from doing so, but it is most unlikely that China would resort to such an action in the near future. One reason for this is that the bomb will not be able to distinguish the “bourgeoisie” and the “reactionary” from the “proletarian”, and its use will turn the masses against China, thereby jeopardising its political aims. As a matter of fact there is no need for China to use the bomb as long its aims are being fulfilled by other means.

This is not to say that we should not turn nuclear. There may not be any immediate necessity for doing so, but, in the long run, we will have to. We must grow militarily over the years as a natural course. We have constantly been pushed into becoming a military power in the past and will be continued to be pushed so until such time that we attain our rightful place on the globe. By virtue of our size and population and the position on the globe, we destined to pose a challenge to the Chinese military supremacy, and a confrontation with them is inevitable. A stage may come when confrontation with a powerful India may lead China to a state of desperation and it may be tempted to use its nuclear power. We cannot be found lacking in this respect then. Nor will it be possible for us to take the bomb and its delivery system out of a hat. Our growth in the nuclear field must, therefore, keep pace with our growth in other military fields as a normal course, even if there is no immediate nuclear threat to the country. We also need nuclear power to acquire political power. When Mao Tse Tung said that political power grows out of the barrel of the gun, in those days there were only guns. Now it grows out of the atom bomb. No wonder that while the US still holds us in contempt, it is going head over heels to please China. We may not want political power to dominate others, but we should want it to prevent political blackmail by others and for looking after our interests.

WHAT MAKES US FALTER

Tracing back our history of defence preparedness we find that rather than going in for it as dictated by the prevalent threat we have been successively pushed into it by circumstances. We have waited at the end of each push to be pushed further till we reached where we are. Comparing the nature and the magnitude of the threat to the country with our present strength, it is evident that we have still miles to go before reaching our defence objectives. Yet if our declarations that our present armed strength is to be our optimum is any indication, it would appear that once again we are waiting at the threshold waiting to be pushed further. There is obviously marked reluctance on our part as far as our defence preparations are concerned; a faltering against which Sardar Patel warned us in his prophetic letter written as way back as 1951. In that letter he had pleaded for a clear cut policy on defence and warned that “any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objective is bound to weaken us and increase the threats that are so evident”. Since that day we have no doubt been forced by circumstances to move a long way towards our defence objective, but certainly not far enough. We even appear to have shifted our objective nearer to suit the distance we have been able to cover. The question naturally arises as to what is it that makes us falter.

LACK OF MILITARY UNDERSTANDING

Today one does not have to possess Sardar Patel’s vision and foresight to be able to gauge the magnitude and gravity of threat to the security of the country. Since the days of Sardar Patel history has taught us many lessons – sometimes the hard way. Yet many in our country,

including a section of the intelligentsia, still display a lack of military understanding. Some of them have even gone to the ridiculous extent of advocating a cut in the defence budget. The fact is that we are not a military-minded nation and find it difficult to grasp the problems of national defence. Having seen and fought wars only as a slave nation for 200 years purely for furthering British imperialistic designs, we have developed a hatred for wars, and our idealism still does not allow us to accept the inevitability of wars. Our interest in the armed forces thus tends to flag as soon as one war is over.

Our lack of understanding of military matters is perhaps perpetuated by the fact that ours is a country where soldiering and politics are completely divorced from each other. There being no conscription, the soldier and the politician seldom change positions. Until such time that the politician himself tastes soldiering, the answer lies in his allowing the soldier a greater say in defence matters than is being done at present. Although since the 1962 war the soldier's say in defence affairs has increased many fold, his voice can still get drowned while the highest rank in the armed forces stands so low in the order of precedence among the government bureaucracy. Besides, modern wars, as we know them, are total wars, wherein the entire national effort and resources need to be geared. The military expert must, therefore, have a say in the grand strategy for defence. This would include a defence oriented economy and foreign policy.

HARD FACTS

Preparation for war throws a great burden on the nation. It will require a strong will to bear it without cracking. Lack of mental robustness may cause the nation to slide into a state of make-believe and wish-full thinking. To be able to put up resistance against such tendencies, we must understand certain hard facts and then bear them in mind while preparing for war. Some of these hard facts to which we must not close our eyes are that:

- (a) that wars cannot be avoided, much less by remaining militarily weak;
- (b) that our fight is a fight for existence, and, whereas the mode of fighting may be changed to suit our resources, we cannot give up fighting for the lack of them;
- (c) that military preparation is a continuous process, and its pitch cannot be allowed to fluctuate with the changing political situation;
- (d) that while hoping for the best, we will have to prepare for the worst situation of fighting China and Pakistan both at the same time;
- (e) that our general defensive policy must not prevent us from being aggressive even when it comes to fighting with China; and that
- (f) treaties and defence pacts are but poor substitutes to possessing independent armed strength – they may be a good umbrella but a bad roof.

THE BOGEY OF DEFENCE BURDEN

The greatest single factor that makes us falter in our defence efforts today is the general impression that the country is carrying far too much of a defence burden, and that any budget larger than the present would be too much for us to bear. This impression, however, appears to be more the result of our inherent abhorrence of wars rather than the reality of things. Even when the budget was at its lowest before 1962, it was considered unbearable, and yet forced by circumstances, we are bearing a defence burden today which is three times what it was then.

The burden of defence being felt by the nation today is obviously more psychological than real. What other reason could there be when judging from all known standards, the country is carrying little defence burden. With the defence budget of about 3.5 percent of our gross

national product, we rank among the 19 countries of the world with the lowest percentages of defence expenditure. Incidentally these, 19 countries do not include our potential enemies. Worked out as a percentage of per capita income our defence budget stands second lowest in the world (1969 figure). A budget of about 16000 crores which, according to rough calculations, would sufficiently meet our defence requirements would form only 4.5 percent of our gross national product – a percentage that Pakistan was spending on defence. The impression that we are too poor and cannot afford to spend any more on defence only goes to prove the truth of an old Chinese adage that “poverty is a state of mind”.

In any case, expenditure on defence (which amounts to expenditure on preservation of freedom) should start pinching us only after we have plugged other drains on the national economy. We lose hundreds of crores every year through wastage, fraud, extravagance and inefficiency and few people seem to be worrying about it. Just to get some idea as to the magnitude of losses through our inefficiency it may be recalled that during the financial year 1969-70 the net loss in 28 public enterprises alone has been estimated at Rupees 75 crores. The annual loss in foreign exchange frauds total up to Rupees 240 crores in a year as per findings of a study team. Losses due to income tax evasion must be immense considering that only 27 Lakhs people out of 54 crores in India pay income tax. With business flourishing these days even at the pettiest level it is difficult to believe that only this number is in a position to pay income-tax. This is not to talk of known tax evaders from whom the Government is yet to recover hundreds of crores in the form of arrears. Even rats in India are believed to be eating away rupees 1,800 crores worth of grain every year, which is more than one and half time our total defence budget. It, of course, goes without saying that a nation which is struggling for existence needs to practice austerity to a much greater degree than we are doing at present. Our socialistic pattern of society has yet to stamp out pomp, show and pageantry that we inherited from the British.

If the value of all waste and losses due to our inefficiency and corruption were to be put together, our entire defence budget would form a mere fraction of this amount. Then why do we not wage a war against this waste and inefficiency to ensure that we have sufficient funds for defence?

CONCLUSION

The decisive victory that we have won against Pakistan has instilled in us a new confidence. It has also shown that a nation is respected in this world only for its military might. In General Manekshaw's words we have made the world to sit up and take notice.

There is, however, no room for complacency. There still exists a threat to the security of the country of a magnitude much more than that which we faced – that is, a combined attack from China and Pakistan. Pakistan, bitter with the humiliating defeat suffered at our hands, is bound to seek revenge. We are also once again a source of Chinese envy, and they would certainly try to cut us down to size. It is not difficult to find an excuse for waging a war, and so we must expect another war at any moment.

Our present armed strength falls terribly short of meeting a combined threat from China and Pakistan. Yet we do not appear to be doing anything about it. Our declarations that we have reached the optimum as far as our armed strength is concerned betray a faltering in our defence preparation against which Sardar Patel warned us in 1951. We probably are relying too much on the Indo-Soviet Treaty to care for our defence. This is dangerous. Not because there is any doubt regarding the Soviet friendship, but because it might prevent us from becoming self-reliant in

defence. There is no substitute to possessing independent armed strength. The period of the treaty should, therefore, only be used in building up that strength.

The greatest single factor that makes us falter in our defence efforts is the economic burden that it imposes on the nation. We must understand that expenditure on defence is expenditure for our existence, and no expenditure on this account can be considered too great. We must some-how find resources to meet our defence requirements. Where there is a *will*, there is always a way.